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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
Nos. 15-2270, 15-2359 
____________ 
 
DANIEL V. MARINO, 
       Appellant in 15-2359 
 
v. 
  
USHER, a/k/a Usher Terry Raymond, IV; JAMES SAMUEL HARRIS, III; TERRY 
STEVEN LEWIS; BOBBY ROSS AVILA, JR.; ISSIAH AVILA, JR.; WILLIAM C. 
GUICE; DANTE E. BARTON; DESTRO MUSIC PRODUCTIONS, INC.; 
DEFENDERS OF MUSIC; FLYTE TYME TUNES; SUBLIME BASEMENT TUNEZ; 
UR-IV MUSIC, INC.; WARNER-TAMERLANE PUBLISHING CORP.; MARK 
PITTS; BYSTORM ENTERTAINMENT; TOMMY VAN DELL; IN2N 
ENTERTAINMENT GROUP, LLC; EMI BLACKWOOD MUSIC, INC.; SONY 
MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT; EMI APRIL MUSIC, INC. 
 
     *Francis Malofiy, Esq., 
          Appellant in 15-2270 
 
      *(Pursuant to Rule 12(a), Fed. R. App. P.) 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 2-11-cv-06811)  
District Judge: Honorable Paul S. Diamond 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on June 23, 2016 
 
Before:   McKEE,  Chief Judge, FISHER and GREENAWAY, JR. Circuit Judges. 
                                              
 Judge McKee concluded his term as Chief of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit on September 30, 2016. 
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(Opinion Filed:  December 8, 2016) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
MCKEE, Chief Judge. 
 Songwriter Daniel Marino appeals the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants in his copyright infringement suit.1  The district court 
found that, because Marino had jointly created the song Club Girl, later developed into 
the derivative work Bad Girl and used by popular musician Usher, Marino’s infringement 
claims must fail.  Marino’s attorney, Francis Malofiy, also appeals the district court’s 
order imposing sanctions against him in the amount of $28,266.54 for contacting an 
unrepresented defendant in the copyright suit, in violation of Rule 4.3 of the 
Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm 
both orders. 
I. 
In its opinion granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the district 
court reiterated what it terms the defendants’ “complete and meritorious defense,” that 
Marino’s claims must fail because Club Girl was jointly created by Marino, Guice, and 
Barton.  The district court correctly held that co-authors of a joint work are each entitled 
                                              
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
1 Marino has appealed what appears to be every order entered by the district court, 
including routine discovery orders and other orders that are plainly unappealable.  App. at 
1–2. 
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to undivided ownership and that the joint owner of a copyright cannot sue his co-owner 
for infringement.2  The court reasoned that, without direct infringement, there can be no 
vicarious infringement, hence the derivative song, Bad Girl, did not infringe on Marino’s 
rights.  The district court also concluded that Guice and Barton conveyed a valid non-
exclusive license for the song to the other defendants.   
Moreover, in rejecting Marino’s contrary claims, the court stated that Marino’s 
argument was so without merit as to be “absurd and contrary to law.”3 The district court 
dismissed Marino’s state law claims without prejudice, noting that all of his federal 
claims had been disposed of and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.  Marino 
appeals. 
The district court also imposed sanctions against Malofiy in the amount of 
$28,266.54 for contacting unrepresented defendant Guice, in violation of Rule 4.3 of the 
Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct.4  Malofiy appeals, and both appeals have 
been consolidated.  
II.5 
                                              
2 See Brownstein v. Lindsay, 742 F.3d 55, 68 (3d Cir. 2014).  See also Cortner v. Israel, 
732 F.2d 267, 271 (2d Cir. 1984) (“It is elementary that the lawful owner of a copyright 
is incapable of infringing a copyright interest that is owned by him; nor can a joint owner 
of a copyright sue his co-owner for infringement.”). 
3 J.A. at 00011. 
4 A three judge panel of this Court recently upheld the district court’s imposition on 
Malofiy of a three-month suspension from the practice of law.  See In re Francis Malofiy, 
Appellant, No. 15-2472, 2016 WL 3553258, at *4 (3d Cir. June 30, 2016). 
5 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The district court had jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1338. 
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 We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment under Rule 56,6 
as well as its dismissals under Rule 12(c).7  To determine whether the district court 
properly granted summary judgment, we employ the same analysis as the district court to 
determine whether any genuine disputes of material fact exist, while considering all 
evidence and all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.8  In reviewing a 
judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), “we must view the facts presented in the 
pleadings and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party.”9  We review findings of fact for clear error, and “due regard shall be 
given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.”10  We 
review a district court’s decision on attorney’s fees and costs for abuse of discretion.11  
III. 
 In addition to his federal copyright claims, Marino’s amended complaint contained 
state law claims for creation of a constructive trust (Count IV) and for an accounting 
(Count V).  Marino argues that the district court erred in dismissing those claims “sua 
sponte.”  However, the record reveals that the district court dismissed the constructive 
                                              
6 See Lucent Info. Mgmt., Inc. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 186 F.3d 311, 315 (3d Cir. 1999). 
7 Hanover Ins. Co. v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 806 F.3d 761, 764 (3d Cir. 2015). 
8 Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). 
9 Hanover Ins. Co., 806 F.3d at 764 (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
10 Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6); see Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573–74 (1985); 
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 215 F.3d 407, 409 (3d Cir. 
2000). 
11 See Hahnemann Univ. Hosp. v. All Shore, Inc., 514 F.3d 300, 305 (3d Cir.2008). 
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trust and accounting claims after defendants had submitted a motion to dismiss and that 
the issue had been fully briefed by both parties.12 
 Under § 301 of the Copyright Act, a state law claim may be preempted if it creates 
rights “equivalent” to the exclusive rights within the scope of copyright.13  That section 
also provides that state law is expressly preempted where the elements of the claim at 
issue are the same as those required for an infringement claim under § 106.14  By 
contrast, “if a state cause of action requires an extra element, beyond mere copying, 
preparation of derivative works, performance, distribution or display, then . . . federal law 
will not preempt the state action.”15  
 Here, the district court correctly applied the express preemption test in § 301(a).16  
Because Marino based his constructive trust claim on monies generated by the alleged 
infringement, the district court concluded that the first element is satisfied, and we agree.  
The second element is satisfied because Marino’s constructive trust and copyright claims 
                                              
12 Accordingly, Marino’s argument that he had no notice of potential preemption issues is 
without merit. 
13 Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 189 F.3d 377, 382 (3d Cir. 1999). 
14 See Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs., Inc. v. Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197, 
217 (3d Cir. 2002). 
15 Id. (quoting Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1164 (1st 
Cir. 1994)). 
16 (1) Whether the work is the appropriate subject matter of a copyright as specified in 17 
U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 and (2) whether the state law creates rights equivalent to the 
exclusive rights protected by the Copyright Act as set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 106.  See 
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 723 F.2d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(rev’d on other grounds) 471 U.S. 539 (1985); 17 U.S.C. § 103(a). 
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arise from the same conduct.17  Accordingly, the district court correctly dismissed 
Marino’s constructive trust claim. 
 Marino’s accounting claims are similarly preempted by the Copyright Act.  
Marino demanded an accounting of monies received from the alleged infringement.  The 
claim is, by its very nature, based on the same conduct alleged in the infringement claim, 
and Marino has failed to allege any additional elements.18  The district court therefore 
correctly found that Marino’s accounting claim was preempted. 
 Marino next argues that the district court improperly determined that Club Girl 
was jointly owned because the trio had a preexisting oral agreement allotting credit and 
revenue for the works that they created. By his own admission, Marino did not make this 
argument until the vast majority of defendants had been granted summary judgment.19  
As the district court correctly explained, this argument comes several years too late and is 
deemed waived.20 Thus, for the reasons repeatedly explained by the district court, we 
conclude that the district court correctly found that Club Girl is a jointly owned work.21 
 Marino next contends that, because he was never credited or paid for his 
contribution to Club Girl, he did not give an implied license for the song’s use.  Non-
                                              
17 See Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs., Inc., 307 F.3d at 217. 
18 Id. 
19 Marino Reply Br. at 15–16. 
20 McLendon v. Cont’l Can Co., 908 F.2d 1171, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990) (“When an issue is 
raised on appeal for the first time in a reply brief, it is generally waived.”). 
21 See Brownstein, 742 F.23d at 55 (“For two or more people to become co-authors, each 
author must contribute some non-trivial amount of creative, original, or intellectual 
expression to the work and both must intend that their contributions be combined.”). 
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exclusive licenses may be granted orally, in writing, or impliedly through conduct.22  The 
existence of an implied license is determined by an objective inquiry into the facts; the 
private hopes of the creator are not relevant.23  Here, Marino’s testimony as well as his 
actions indicate that he supported the use of Club Girl/Bad Girl by Usher.  Marino never 
sought to enjoin the song’s release, he participated in events and celebrations surrounding 
the song, and he testified that he was excited at its commercial success.  In addition, the 
record reveals that Marino admits receiving $4,553.06 in royalties from Barton in 2006.24  
Accordingly, the district court correctly found that Marino granted an implied license to 
the Appellees for the use of Club Girl.25 
 Marino also argues that the district court erred in dismissing his sound recording 
claim for lack of standing.  The law is clear that a work must be preregistered with the 
Copyright Office before suit can be brought for an alleged copyright violation.26  As the 
district court held, sound recordings and musical compositions are distinct from one 
another and require two different registrations.27  Here, the record reveals that, although 
                                              
22 See MacLean Assoc., Inc. v. Wm. M. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, Inc., 952 F.2d 769, 
778–79 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting 3 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Nimmer of Copyright § 
10.03(A), at 10–37 (1991) for the proposition that “[a] nonexclusive license may be 
granted orally, or may even be implied from conduct”). 
23 John G. Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant Props., Inc., 322 F.3d 26, 42 (1st Cir. 
2003). 
24 J.A. at 00440, 01798–99, 02573–74. 
25 See I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 1996).  
26 Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 157–58 (2010).  See also 17 U.S.C. § 
411 (providing that “no civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States 
work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has 
been made in accordance with this title”). 
27 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2), (7); Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1026 (3d Cir. 
2008). 
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the musical compositions of Club Girl and Bad Girl were registered, the sound 
recordings were never registered with the Copyright Office.  Accordingly, the district 
court correctly denied Marino’s sound recording claim. 
 Marino relies on the doctrine of equitable tolling to argue that the district court 
improperly limited his claims for infringement damages to those damages that occurred 
within three years of the filing of this case.  However, since we affirm the district court’s 
conclusion that that there was no infringement, tolling is simply not an issue, and we 
need not address it. 
 Marino also argues that the district court abused its discretion in awarding costs 
and fees to the defendants in the amount of $110,888.60, reduced from a court-
determined amount of $1,108,885.95 due to Marino’s inability to pay.  In awarding fees, 
a district court may consider “‘frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness 
(both in the factual and in the legal components of the case) and the need in particular 
circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence.’”28  Courts will 
consider the party’s ability to pay when setting the final amount of costs and fees.29  
Here, the district court carefully considered all of the statutory factors and examined the 
relevant evidence before it arrived at its final amount.  The district court also conducted 
financial discovery to determine Marino’s ability to pay costs and fees.  After an 
evidentiary hearing, the district court determined that the award should be reduced by 90 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
28 Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534–35 n.19 (1994) (quoting Lieb v. Topstone 
Indus., Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 156 (3d Cir. 1986)). 
29 Lieb, 788 F.2d at 156. 
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percent due to Marino’s financial circumstances and the frivolous nature of his claims.30  
Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the award of costs and fees in the amount 
of $110,888.60. 
 Marino’s contention on appeal that the district court’s impartiality should be 
questioned is meritless.  Judicial remarks may support a challenge to judge’s impartiality 
“if they reveal an opinion that derives from an extrajudicial source,” or “if they reveal 
such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.”31  
Marino has no shown that the district court’s opinion either derives from an extrajudicial 
source or reveals the requisite level of antagonism.  Instead, the brief merely claims that 
“the Court’s opinions and findings departed from law and the largely undisputed facts of 
this case and revealed a bias against Plaintiff.”32  Contrary to Marino’s assertions, the 
record reveals that the district court acted properly and impartially throughout the 
proceedings.  It also reveals that those proceedings were fraught with misconduct by 
Marino’s attorney, Francis Malofiy. 
IV. 
 We turn now to Malofiy’s appeal of the district court’s order imposing sanctions 
in the amount of $28,266.54 for contacting unrepresented defendant William Guice,33 in 
violation of Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 4.3.34 The district court acted 
                                              
30 Lieb, 788 F.2d at 156 (court should consider whether award is excessive in light of 
“plaintiff’s resources”) 
31 Liteky v. U.S., 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). 
32 Marino Br. at 64. 
33 CM/ECF No. 15-2270. 
34 Rule 4.3 provides that: 
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under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 as well as under its own inherent authority over the conduct of 
proceedings before it.  To impose sanctions, a court must find that an attorney “has (1) 
multiplied proceedings; (2) in an unreasonable and vexatious manner; (3) thereby 
increasing the cost of the proceedings; and (4) doing so in bad faith or by intentional 
misconduct.”35    
 The district court made the following factual determinations when examining the 
evidence regarding Malofiy and Guice’s interactions. 
“[S]ometime around Valentine’s Day, 2012,” Guice (then living in 
Colorado) telephoned Malofiy, whose name and telephone number were 
on the pleading’s first page. (Id. at 20:5–7; 18:8–13; 16:20–17:14; 
57:25–58:9; 29:13–16.) Malofiy said that he represented Plaintiff and 
that Guice had no obligation to speak with him. Malofiy did not ask if 
Guice was represented by counsel, nor did he advise Guice to obtain 
counsel. (Id. 20–21.) Malofiy did not inform Guice that Marino’s 
interests were adverse to Guice’s. (Id. at 21.) To the contrary, Malofiy 
untruthfully assured Guice: “don’t worry about it, he [Plaintiff] is not 
coming after you, it’s everyone else.” (Id. at 32:2–8.) Malofiy thus 
dishonestly convinced Guice that Marino was pursuing claims against 
only Barton and moving Defendants. (Id. at 23–24.) 
                                                                                                                                                  
(a) In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented 
by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is 
disinterested.  
(b) During the course of a lawyer's representation of a client, a lawyer 
shall not give advice to a person who is not represented by a lawyer, 
other than the advice to secure counsel, if the lawyer knows or 
reasonably should know the interests of such person are or have a 
reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of the 
lawyer’s client.  
(c) When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the 
unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer’s role in the matter, the 
lawyer should make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.  
35 In re Schaefer Salt Recovery, Inc., 542 F.3d 90, 101 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing In re 
Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig., 278 F.3d 175, 188 (3d Cir. 2002)). 
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 The district court also found that Malofiy persuaded Guice to sign an affidavit 
stating that he, Barton, and Marino had created Club Girl together and that Guice’s belief 
that Marino was entitled to producing and writing credit.  The district court concluded 
that, due to Malofiy’s misrepresentations, Guice never answered Marino’s complaint, 
with the result that a default judgment (later vacated) was entered against him.  During 
Guice’s first deposition, it was revealed that, although Malofiy told Guice that he (Guice) 
was a defendant, Guice “did not know the meaning of ‘defendant,’” that [Guice] was a 
party to the copyright litigation; that [Marino] was seeking money damages from him 
personally; or that Malofiy had obtained a default against him.”36  Guice was so upset by 
these revelations that he left the deposition and had to be deposed again at a later date, 
which the district court found duplicated proceedings and increased costs.  The district 
court further found that Malofiy acted both intentionally and unreasonably in his dealings 
with Guice, and that Malofiy’s actions had no legitimate purpose.  The district court 
credited Guice’s testimony that Malofiy did not advise him to retain counsel during their 
first conversation, and it further found that Malofiy’s email to Guice stating that “if you 
want to review [the affidavit] with a lawyer, that’s fine too,” was insufficient to satisfy 
Rule 4.3.37 
 A panel of this Court recently addressed Malofiy’s behavior when affirming his 
three month suspension from the practice of law. The panel explained: 
                                              
36 DCT Op. at 8. 
37 J.A. at 00083. 
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we must determine whether Malofiy’s warning in the e-mail and his 
acknowledgment of Guice’s status as a defendant satisfy Rule 4.3. The 
District Court determined that Malofiy’s actions “failed to adequately 
convey the adversity of interests between [his] client and Mr. Guice.” 
App. 40–41. We agree. Per Rule 4.3(c), Malofiy “kn[ew] or reasonably 
should [have] know[n] that the unrepresented person misunderst[ood] 
the lawyer’s role in the matter.” Rather than correct the 
misunderstanding, Malofiy continued to foster the impression that Guice 
was a witness rather than a person who stood personally to lose money. 
As the first comment to the rule makes clear, Malofiy should have 
remedied the confusion by explaining that Guice’s interests were adverse 
to Marino’s. However, he consistently suggested that the opposite was 
true.38 
We agree with this analysis and conclude that Malofiy did in fact violate Rule 4.3.  
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed sanctions on 
Malofiy in the amount of $28,266.54. 
V. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the district court. 
                                              
38 In re Francis Malofiy, Appellant, No. 15-2472, 2016 WL 3553258, at *4 (3d Cir. June 
30, 2016). 
